On September
25, a bug deemed “Shellshock” was discovered in Bash, a command shell on Unix, Linux
and Mac OS X operating systems that is used heavily in scripting and for communication
between one program and an operating system for certain kinds of services. Much
of the media attention has centered on how Shellshock is a threat to
cybersecurity in general, lumping all practice areas under one umbrella. Since critical
infrastructure networks are much more difficult to patch and update than
corporate networks, many control system security practitioners are wondering
what, specifically, are the implications of Shellshock on control system
networks, and what can we do to protect against these vulnerabilities.
Surprisingly, a recent search of the Internet yielded no clear summary of the
impacts of Shellshock on control networks specifically, hence this posting.
In order to
be affected by Shellshock in the first place, a device must have Bash
installed. Since Bash is not a standard Windows component, it’s unlikely that Windows
systems will be vulnerable unless the program was installed for some reason.
Mac OS X and Linux both use Bash heavily, and if any non-Linux Unix is running
on a network, then Bash is also very likely deployed somewhere within that
system, if not everywhere.
Here are
some examples of how Bash might affect particular systems:
·
Web servers
that use CGI scripts, like Apache, transfer information like the “user agent”
string directly to Bash. That string can be set in some browsers, and is easily
set in many popular command-line Internet tools. The exploitation of these
vulnerable web servers is trivial. This compromise can be accomplished from any
IP address that has access to send a web request into the vulnerable server.
·
Most Mac/Linux/Unix
gear that uses DHCP on an industrial network is ripe for an attack from the
local network. While most critical control systems have been drilled into using
static IP addresses rather than DHCP for exactly this reason, some sites still
have equipment using DHCP. If a hacker can get his hands on a laptop or other
computer connected to a control network and can turn on a DHCP server on the
machine, all bets are off.
·
Every device
that runs Linux or some other Unix derivative with Bash installed, and has a
Web user interface, is vulnerable. This includes a lot of networking gear,
firewalls and even some RTUs, PLCs and other equipment. Figuring out which of
these firmware-based systems have Bash installed is problematic in itself. Vulnerable
equiment can generally be hacked by any machine, which can send a message to
the Web server.
Software and
firmware updates should of course only be applied to equipment on control
system networks after thoroughly researching a patch’s reliability. In
principle, while patches are being tested, or in some cases still being developed,
all vulnerable DHCP, web and other functionalities should be disabled. This is
easier said than done since it is not even clear which devices with embedded
Unix-based operating systems have Bash installed at all, not to mention that
some of the affected functions may be essential to the current design and
operation of the control system.
This is just
another example of why many control system vendors deploy Unidirectional
Security Gateways. The gateways replicate servers to external networks to
provide seamless, safe integration of control system networks with corporate
and other networks. IT teams can then feel free to install the latest,
up-to-the-second updates to all equipment on corporate networks, including the replica
servers, without putting critical operations at risk.
The takeaway
here is nothing new, and yet, is underlined with each new serious vulnerability.
And all software has bugs, some of which are security vulnerabilities, meaning
all software can be hacked. Industrial users should deploy hardware-enforced,
stronger-than-firewalls perimeter protections to ensure that the next
Shellshock, or dozen Shellshocks, do not expose critical infrastructures to
attacks from corporate networks, and from the Internet beyond those networks.
To find out
more about ICS security solutions, check out our products page
here.
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